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Resumen. El Código Cooperativo portugués permite a las cooperativas establecer sociedades 
mercantiles y filiales, así como adquirir participaciones en el capital social de sociedades mercantiles, 
siempre y cuando ello no perjudique la autonomía de la cooperativa. Si la cooperativa adopta esta 
estrategia de grupo para satisfacer las necesidades de sus miembros, nos encontramos ante el 
concepto de "mutualidad indirecta", admitido expresamente en la doctrina y en la legislación de 
ciertos ordenamientos jurídicos. En estos casos, la Cuenta Satélite de la Economía Social debe 
considerar a estas sociedades mercantiles controladas o participadas por cooperativas como entidades 
de la economía social. Por tal motivo, es necesario un análisis casuístico que permita distinguir entre 
la mutualidad indirecta y la societalización del fenómeno cooperativo. 
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Abstract. The Portuguese Cooperative Code allows cooperatives to set up commercial companies, 
subsidiaries, and acquire shares in the capital of commercial companies, provided this does not affect 
the autonomy of the cooperative. If through these group strategies, the cooperative aims to meet the 
needs of its members, we will be facing on the concept of ‘indirect mutuality’, a concept expressly 
admitted by the doctrine and the rules of certain jurisdictions. In these cases, the Social Economy 
Satellite Account should consider these commercial companies owned or participated by cooperatives 
as entities of the social economy. Therefore, a case-by-case analysis will be carried out to distinguish 
situations of indirect mutuality from situations of companization of the cooperative phenomenon. 
Keywords: Cooperative group; Commercial companies; Indirect mutuality; Social economy; Guiding 
principles; Satellite Account. 
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1. Introduction 
In Portugal, the cooperatives have been adopting group strategies, through the 
establishment of commercial companies, holding companies (SGPS), subsidiaries, 
shares in the capital of national or non-national commercial companies. 
Taking into account the data of the Social Economy Satellite Account (SESA 
2013)3, for the total number of cooperatives in question (2177 cooperatives), there 
are 188 cooperatives holding a total of 340 shares in the capital of other entities, of 
which 42 own 100% of the share capital of said entities.4 
Approximately 81% of the commercial companies that are 100% owned by 
cooperatives develop their economic activity in the following areas: development, 
housing and environment (26.8%), processing activities (22%), culture, sports and 
recreation (17.1%), trade, consumption and services (14.6%). 
The economic relevance of these commercial companies owned by cooperatives 
is evident. In fact, in 2013, this phenomenon has generated approximately 137.8 
million EUR of Gross Value Added (GVA). In addition, the commercial 
companies 100% owned by the cooperatives were also responsible for the payment 
of 46.8 million EUR on compensations in 2013. 
As it is highlighted in SESA, this reality makes the analysis of the economic 
dimension of the cooperatives more complex. 
In line with the French SESA (2013 Edition), it was decided not to include the 
values presented by the commercial companies 100% owned by cooperative capital 
or by other commercial companies, directly or indirectly owned by cooperatives, 
although it was included in the document a “box” containing additional 
information about the group strategies and its importance in terms of employment 
and GVA. 
This option has an obvious impact. As set out in the said “box”, if the GVA 
generated by these commercial companies was take into account, the cooperatives 
would turn into the second group of the most relevant entities of the social 
economy, and the weight of the GVA of the social economy in the total of the 
national economy would rise from 2.8% to 2.9%. 
In this paper, we intend to inquire if this option of excluding these commercial 
companies owned or held (directly or indirectly) by cooperatives within the social 
economy sector and not consider their economic value for statistical purposes, is 
_____________ 
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juridically the most appropriate approach, considering the guiding principles of this 
sector enshrined in the Portuguese Framework Law on Social Economy (LBES)5. 
This quest will involve a preliminary reflection on the reasons justifying these 
group strategies, regarding the concept of “indirect mutuality” and its eligibility in 
the Portuguese legal system, as well as on the economic regime of the results 
arising from the shares of cooperatives in commercial companies. 
Methodologically, this study bases itself on a bibliographic and desk research, 
and on the analysis of the legislation that frames this thematic. 
2. Inter-cooperation and integration of cooperatives: grounds and framework 
The economic globalization, the emergence of major international economic 
groups and the saturation of the market, have forced the cooperatives to increase 
their size, in order to become more competitive. In fact, one can see that many 
cooperatives are small and medium-sized and, frequently, to survive in the 
competitive market that surrounds them, they have to get involved in integration 
and cooperation processes (Vasserot, 2010; Nagore, 2016). 
These processes have their bases, from the outset, in Article 61(3) of the 
Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, under which: “Cooperatives can be 
grouped into unions, federations, and confederations or other forms of organization 
provided by law.” 
In the same vein, Article 7(1) of the LBES states that: “social economy entities 
may organise themselves freely and group themselves into associations, unions, 
federations, or confederations that represent and defend their interests” (Meira, 
2013). 
Finally, the Portuguese Cooperative Code (PCC), approved by the Law 
119/2015, of August 31, allows various forms of articulation among cooperatives: 
multi-sector cooperatives (Article 4(2)); the incorporation of cooperatives of a 
higher degree or the second degree (Articles 101 to 108); and the association 
between cooperatives and other legal persons (Article 8). 
All these forms have their bases on Article 3 of the PCC, which states the 
principle of cooperation among cooperatives, and provides that “cooperatives serve 
their members most effectively and strengthen the cooperative movement by 
working together through local, national, regional, and international structures.” 
This principle establishes a duty of mutual cooperation among cooperatives (inter-
cooperation) that has the aim of continuing the interests of cooperators and the 
community in which the cooperative operates. 
The concept of inter-cooperation adopted in this study is nevertheless broader 
than the cooperative principle underlying the above definition, since we believe 
that this concept can cover both relations among cooperatives and relations 
between cooperatives and other legal persons. 
The doctrine points two classification criteria, regarding the inter-cooperation 
forms: a criterion that distinguishes between the formal and the informal inter-
_____________ 
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cooperation; another one that distinguishes between horizontal and vertical inter-
cooperation (Namorado, 1995; Leite, 2012). 
The informal inter-cooperation results in a set of contractual relationships that 
reflect an economic or another, more or less regular, form of collaboration and 
does not lead to a loss of individuality on the part of each cooperative. 
In turn, the formal inter-cooperation translates into the integration of 
cooperatives into higher-tier structures or into associations by cooperatives with 
other legal persons, resulting the creation of another legal person of a cooperative 
or other nature. 
Inter-cooperation may take one of two forms: horizontal inter-cooperation 
(between cooperatives from the same or different branches, or between 
cooperatives and other legal persons); and vertical inter-cooperation (cooperative 
groups and second-tier cooperatives). 
In all these cases of inter-cooperation, and as stated in Article 3 of the PCC, the 
aim is to increase the effectiveness of how a cooperative serves its members, with 
its mutualist scope being the ultimate foundation for these processes. 
3. The technical and legal expedient of the association of cooperatives with 
other legal persons 
3.1. The terms of association 
Focusing now on the terms of association, the Article 8(1) of the PCC provides for 
“the association of cooperatives and other legal persons, provided that this 
association respects the cooperative principle of autonomy and independence.” 
From this rule, it follows that: 
(i) Cooperatives can associate with two categories of legal persons: legal 
persons of a cooperative or non-cooperative nature (associations, 
foundations, civil companies, commercial companies, and others); and 
(ii) This association may or may not result in the creation of another legal 
person. 
 
Legal persons created by associations of cooperatives are cooperatives that must 
not be confused with second-tier cooperatives (Namorado, 2000). This 
understanding is reinforced by Article 8(3), of the PCC, which expressly allows the 
extension of the voting regime of higher-tier cooperatives to legal persons resulting 
from an association between cooperatives. 
Under Article 8 of the PCC, cooperatives may also join a consortium or an 
association in the form of a partnership (Decree-Law No. 231/81 of 28 July 1981) 
or participate in a complementary group of companies (Decree-Law No. 43/73 of 
25 August 1973)6. 
_____________ 
 
6  Regarding the admissibility of the participation by a cooperative in a complementary group of companies, see 
the Opinion issued by the “Conselho Técnico da Direção-Geral dos Registos e do Notariado” dated 
24.04.2001, in Boletim dos Registos e Notariado, May 2001 (Parecer da Direção-Geral dos Registos e do 
Notariado de 24 de abril de 2001). 




Under Article 8(1) of the PCC, maintaining the autonomy and independence of a 
cooperative is a necessary condition for its association with other legal persons. 
This idea of autonomy and independence refers to the cooperative principle of 
the autonomy and the independence (Article 3 of the PCC)7 and it will aim to 
ensure that the cooperative’s association with other legal persons calls into 
question neither the independence of the cooperative nor its democratic member 
control. We are therefore referring to autonomy in the existence and winding up of 
the cooperative (which could be jeopardised if unlimited liability is assumed) and 
to autonomy in the management of its business and assets. 
On the same line as Correia & Rodrigues (2012: 393), we disagree with 
Namorado's position when he argues that observance of the principle of autonomy 
would not be compatible with the integration of a cooperative into a commercial 
company in which it did not hold a majority position (Namorado, 2000: 190). This 
doctrinal position would prevent, from the outset, the establishment of commercial 
companies exclusively by cooperatives, in which the different cooperative partners 
will not be able to hold the majority of the shares. 
Thus, to determine if the autonomy is or is not affected by the cooperative 
association with other legal persons, it is needed a case-by-case assessment. 
In this direction, it is important to stress some examples of factual and legal 
situations that can imply the loss of autonomy (Correia & Rodrigues, 2012), 
namely: 
(i) The assumption of unlimited liability by the cooperative, as a partner of a 
commercial company; 
(ii) The allocation by the cooperative of a significant part of its property to 
make a contribution to a commercial company that has a subordination 
contract with another partner; 
(iii) The displacement by the cooperative of instrumental activities, although 
essential to its functioning for a commercial company, in which originally 
had the majority of votes, but lost them later, following an increase in the 
capital; or 
(iv) The case of the execution of a shareholders’ agreement by the 
cooperative that affects its voting rights in a constituted company that is 





7  This principle states that “Cooperatives are autonomous, self-help organisations controlled by their members. 
If they enter into agreements with other organisations, including governments, or raise capital from external 
sources, they do so on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their cooperative 
autonomy.” 
8  The shareholders agreements are conventions concluded between two or more persons, on the side-lines of the 
memorandum and the articles of association of the company, which focus on social matters and aim at the 
production of a legal bond between them. 
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3.3. Problematization of the question of knowing if the cooperatives can 
establish companies 
The Article 8(1) of the PCC allows the cooperatives to set up companies, including 
commercial companies, provided this association does not undermine the 
autonomy of the cooperative, as previously mentioned. 
We find no restriction in the corporate legal regime on participation of a 
cooperative in a commercial company, since neither Article 980 of the Portuguese 
Civil Code,9 nor the Commercial Companies Code (CSC) (except for cases in 
which the CSC requires that the partner have a certain corporate form, as in the 
system of affiliated companies, particularly with regard to companies in a group 
relationship) poses any obstacle to the access of a cooperative to a partner in a 
commercial company (Correia & Rodrigues, 2012). 
In this context, cooperatives may create companies, including commercial 
companies. 
Cooperatives may not, however, constitute any kind of commercial company. 
Indeed, given the rules in Article 8 of the PCC (namely the prohibition against loss 
of autonomy) cooperatives cannot assume unlimited liability in commercial 
companies. 
This means that not all types of company, or types of liability permitted by 
them, will be accessible to cooperatives. 
In particular, cooperatives cannot be a partner in a general partnership or be a 
general partner in a limited partnership, because in these types of companies, the 
partners, besides of being held accountable to the company for its obligation of 
contribution, they are also held accountable to company's creditors for the 
company's obligations (Articles 175 and 465 of the CSC). 
In the case of a private limited company, cooperatives cannot assume liability 
for company debts in their statutes, on the terms mentioned in Article 198 of the 
CSC.10 
3.4. Problematization of the possibility of a cooperative itself creating a 
commercial company  
As mentioned before, from the data contained in the Social Economy Satellite 
Account (SESA 2013) results that 42 cooperatives hold, directly or indirectly, the 
totality (100%) of the share capital of other legal persons. 
We will be referring, from the outset, to the single-member private limited 
company (sociedades unipessoais por quotas (Arts 270-A ff. of the CSC), 
created originally by cooperatives and to the situations of supervening tolerated 
_____________ 
 
9  This norm provides that “Memorandum of association is the one in which two or more people commit to 
contribute with goods or services to pursuit together a certain economic activity that is not of mere fruition, in 
order to distribute the profits resulting from this activity.” 
10  The Article 198 of the CSC constitutes a deviation from the general rule of the limitation of liability of the 
partners of the private limited company. Indeed, Article 197(3) of the CSC provides that only the assets of the 
company shall be accountable to the company's creditors. The Article 198(1) allows that, through a statutory 
provision, the partners assume direct liability towards the company's creditors (joint or subsidiary in relation 
to the company and to perform only in the liquidation phase); despite of being a personal liability, it continues 
to be a limited liability (“up to a certain amount”). 
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single-shareholdership (Article 142, paragraph 1(a), of the CSC). This last situation 
occurs when a company is established with several partners, but due to several 
vicissitudes sees the number of partners reduced to the unit and, consequently, 
witnesses the concentration of the shares held by remaining partner. In this case, 
we will have an alleged transience of the supervening single-shareholdership, with 
risks of a deferred dissolution.11 
It is excluded the direct establishment, by cooperatives, of single-member 
public limited companies, because the corporate legislator does not allow that a 
cooperative establishes, for itself, a single-member public limited company, 
affecting this ability to the private limited companies, public limited companies and 
limited partnerships by shares [Article 488(1), in set with Article 481(1) of the 
CSC]. 
In this context, it seems clear that when we talk about the possibility of a 
cooperative establishing, alone and directly, a commercial company, we are 
referring only to single-member private limited company [Article 270(A) et seq. of 
the CSC]. As a matter of fact, Article 270(C), paragraph 2, of the CSC allows the 
unilateral establishment of a single-member private limited company by any legal 
persons, as long as it is not another private limited company (Costa, 2003). 
Nothing prevents, according to our point of view, the cooperative to establish a 
single-member private limited company. The incorporated company enjoys 
autonomy of assets and the sole shareholder (the cooperative) has limited liability. 
In fact, the company and the cooperative are two separate legal entities, with 
separate accounts. From a tax perspective, the company and the cooperative have 
different tax regimes and therefore the tax benefits afforded to the cooperative are 
not applicable to the company. Finally, the sole shareholder (in this case the 
cooperative) controls the single-member private limited company, in full 
compliance with the principle of the democratic member control and the principle 
of autonomy and independence (Costa, 2003). 
3.5. The question of the cooperative groups 
The PCC is silent on the issue of cooperative groups. Thus, if one takes into 
account the provisions of Article 9 of the PCC, which contains a reference to the 
CSC, which is immediately applicable to anything that is not specifically provided 
for in the PCC, and since the solution does not infringe cooperative principles 
(Frada & Gonçalves, 2009), we must reflect on arrangements for cooperative 
groups that are consistent with those principles to which Portuguese cooperatives 
may have access. 
The corporate law does not allow the cooperatives to establish the so-called 
legal company groups, which means those whose creation results from the use of 
one of the legal instruments that the Commercial Companies Code explicitly 
predicted for this purpose. In the Portuguese legal system, there are three 
_____________ 
 
11  The Article 142(1) of the CSC provides that the dissolution can be administratively required: “a) When, for 
over a year, the number of partners is inferior to the minimum required by law, except if one of the remaining 
partners is the State or entity equivalent to him in law for that purpose.” 
110 Meira, D. Revesco (131) 2019: 103-124 
 
instruments: the total control (Articles 488 and 489 of the CSC);12 the joint venture 
relating to groups (Article 492 of the CSC)13 and the subordination agreement 
(Article 493 of the CSC).14 The rules governing these legal instruments are 
exceptional (Antunes, 2002), therefore, its application by analogy is not possible. 
This exceptional nature finds its foundation in two deviations from the 
traditional normative standard: (i) in the group relations, the managing company 
(partner of the subordinated one in the group relations by total control; and partner 
in the group relations based on subordination agreement) has the right to give 
binding instructions to the management of the subordinated company (Article 503 
of the CSC); (ii) as counterpoint to the existing permeability between the grouped 
companies and its assets, it is allowed to the creditors of the subordinated company 
a supplemental protection, imposing a personal and unlimited liability of the 
managing company (or head) for all the obligations of the subordinated company. 
Therefore, in exchange for the power of emanating binding instructions, the 
managing company answers without limits for the obligations and losses of the 
subordinated company, in benefit of the creditors of this company (Costa, 2014). 
Thus, regarding the cooperatives, when we talk about groups, we will be only 
talking about de facto company groups, that is to say, those where the management 
power held by the parent company on its subsidiaries had its origin not in a legal 
instrument of establishment of the group, but in contractual legal instruments or 
other sources, as majority shareholding, shareholder agreements, inter-company 
contracts, economic and factual relations of dependence (Antunes, 2002). 
4. The cooperative Integration and the question of the indirect mutuality 
4.1. Previous presentation of some examples from the cooperative practices 
For a better understanding of the concept of indirect mutuality and its possible 
admissibility in the Portuguese legal system, we resort, previously, to a few 
examples from the practice on the cooperative economic groups. 
Specifically, we will describe three cooperative groups that have in common the 
circumstance of the cooperative holding 100% of the share capital of an entity 
whose legal form is the one of a holding company (SGPS), which in turn holds 
shares of other companies. 
The Holding Companies (SGPS), regulated by the Decree-Law 495/88, of 
December 30,15 are commercial companies, that can adopt the form of private 
limited company or public limited company, that concern the lasting holding of 
_____________ 
 
12  In accordance with the Article 488 of the CSC, the initial or original total control relies on the exclusive 
ownership of a public limited company by one single partner that will be able to assume the form of a public 
limited company (single or plural), a private limited company (single or plural) or a limited partnership by 
shares. 
13  Group situation of agreement basis, where companies, independent of one another, subordinate themselves to 
a single and common management. 
14  Group situation of agreement basis, in which a company (called subordinate) subordinates its management to 
the board of another company, called “head company”, dominant or not of the first company. 
15  With the changes that were introduced by the Decree-Law 318/94, of December 23, by the Decree-Law 78/98, 
of November 27 and by the Law 109-B/2001, of December 27. 
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shares of other companies, legally independent, not exerting directly an economic 
activity. They are framed in the general figure of the holding companies, being 
companies established with the purpose of intervening in the management and 
control of the participated ones, exerting the social rights inherent to the 
corresponding shares, in order to receive the profits or dividends, as well as the 
resultant incomes of eventual alienations of these shares. 
Through the Holding Companies, the cooperatives exert indirectly an economic 
activity. Thus, Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Decree-Law 495/88 provides that “(...) 
the share in a company is considered to be an indirect way of the exercise of an 
economic activity when it does not have occasional character and reaches, at least, 
10% of the share capital with voting rights of the subsidiary company, either by 
itself, or through shares of other companies that the Holding Company is 
dominant” (Lopes, 1998). 
Of the information available in the electronic page of the “Grupo Lacticoop”, 
results that the Group includes a union of cooperatives, the “Lacticoop, UCRL”, 
whose corporate object is the wholesale trade of milk, which, through a Holding 
Company, the “Lacticoop SGPS Unipessoal, Lda.”, participates in the 
“LACTOGAL - Produtos Alimentares, SA.”. Through this SGPS, the cooperative 
is, equally, shareholder of the “Matadouros da Beira Litoral, SA”, a company 
whose corporate object is the promotion of the regional development, 
implementation, namely by the direct or indirect exercise of the slaughter, 
transformation, treatment and commercialization of meats and its derivatives, in 
which it withholds a shareholding of 29.38%. It is, also, through the same SGPS, 
partner of the “Segalab - Laboratório de sanidade animal e segurança alimentar, 
SA”, that has as corporate object the rendering of services of analyses and samples 
of veterinary, agricultural origin, of food and feed, as well as the support to the 
dairy farms and the rendering of services of assistance to the hygiene and health 
control of the production, processing and supply chains and companies of the agri-
food sector, in which withholds a shareholding of 2%. Through the same SGPS, 
she is the only partner of “Naturar SA”, company whose corporate object includes 
the activities of processing, trading and packing agricultural products. Finally, 
through the same SGPS, it is partner of the “Terra a Terra - Produtos Agrícolas, 
Lda.”, a company whose corporate object is the wholesale trade of milk and other 
agricultural products, developing as complementary activities the road transport of 
goods, national and international on behalf of third parties; maintenance and repair 
of vehicles and equipment, distribution and transportation of agricultural products, 
rental of machinery and equipment, the provision of logistical and operational 
services, farming and agribusiness exploitation, provision of technical support 
services in these areas. In this company, it withholds a shareholding of 99,93%.16 






16  Information available in http://www.lacticoop.pt/2/participacoes.html (retrieved on 16 July 2017). 
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Figure. 1. Group Lacticoop. 
 
Group Lacticoop - http://www.lacticoop.pt/2/participacoes.html 
In turn, through the information available on the electronic page of the 
cooperative Proleite, one can verify the existence of a scheme of relations between 
the entities that constitute the Proleite Group. The Proleite cooperative, CRL is 
owner of the Proleite SGPS that, in turn, holds a share of 33.3% of the capital of 
LACTOGAL – Produtos Alimentares, SA.17 In the same electronic page, it is 
possible to see a scheme of relationships between the entities that constitute the 
Proleite Group (as presented in the diagram below): 
_____________ 
 
17  Information available in http://www.proleite.com.pt/index.php/grupo-proleite (retrieved on 16 July 2017). 
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Figure. 2. Proleite Group. 
 
Proleite Group - http://www.proleite.com.pt/index.php/grupo-proleite 
Similarly, the scheme that illustrates the relationships of the Agros Group, 
available in its electronic page, suggests that the relationship between Agros UCRL 
and LACTOGAL - Produtos Alimentares, SA is also mediated by Agros SGPS.18 
On the same electronics page, it is possible to query a scheme of relationships 




18  Information available in http://www.agros.pt/a-agros#grupo-agros (retrieved on16 July 2017). 
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Figure. 3. Agros Group. 
 
Agros Group - http://www.agros.pt/a-agros#grupo-agros 
4.2. The indirect mutuality 
We will dwell not on the reasons that were on the basis of the formation of these 
groups and that led these cooperatives to resort to real operations of corporate 
engineering. Briefly, the doctrine points out some legal limitations of the 
cooperative model that prevent the growth and the possibilities of expansion and 
penetration of the cooperatives into new markets, as well as obtaining external 
resources: limits on the transfer of the cooperator’s position, limits on the investor 
members, difficulties in concentrating capital and attracting foreign investment, 
obligation to allocate mandatory and indivisible reserves, limits on operations with 
third parties, limits on investment in commercial companies, among others 
(Vasserot, 2010). 
What is certain is that from the examples mentioned it follows that cooperatives 
concerned develop their activity or, at least, a substantial part of it, not directly 
with its members, in the context of the cooperative, but indirectly through 
commercial companies controlled or participated by the own cooperative. 
There are legal systems that, in this regard, recognize, specifically, the concept 
of “indirect mutuality”. Effectively, one can indicate the Article L.24.1 of the 
French Code of Commerce for merchants cooperatives,19 as amended in 2001 
(Hiez, 2013), the Finnish Law of 2002, in which the interchange between the 
cooperator partner and a controlled company (at least in 51%) by the cooperative is 
considered, expressly, as “mutualist”, on the condition that the cooperative 
withholds the control of the company (Henry, 2013) and the Norwegian Law, as 
amended in 2007, which establishes, in the Article 1, Paragraph 3, of the 
Cooperative Act, 29 June 2007, No. 81, a definition of indirect mutuality, featuring 
that “A cooperative society also exists if the interests of the members [...] are 
promoted through the members’ trade with an enterprise, which the cooperative 
_____________ 
 
19  Law 2001-420 of the 15th of May 2001. 
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society owns alone or together with other cooperative societies, including 
secondary cooperative [...]” (Fjortoft & Gjems-Onstadt, 2013). 
This concept also seems to be admitted in the Principles of European 
Cooperative Law (PECOL), the first project developed by the SGECOL (Study 
Group on European Cooperative Law), considering that when the concept of 
cooperative is defined (Section 1.1 (3)) one admits that “cooperative enterprise  
may include an enterprise carried out by a subsidiary if this is necessary to satisfy 
the interests of the members and the members of the cooperative maintain the 
ultimate control of the subsidiary” (Fajardo et al, 2017:19). 
One shall not forget that the cooperatives have a mutualistic scope, once they 
aim, mainly, at the satisfaction of the needs of its members, as consumers, 
suppliers or workers of the cooperative, being this scope what distinguishes them 
from other entities. What truly identifies the cooperative is the absence of an 
autonomous scope that differentiates itself from the interests of the cooperators. 
Following the mutualistic scope of the cooperative, the cooperators assume the 
obligation of participating in the activity of the cooperative, cooperating mutually 
and helping one another in obedience to the cooperative principles [Article 22, 
Paragraph 2(c) of the PCC]. Such means that the cooperatives operate with its 
members, in the scope of an activity that is directed at them and in which they 
participate cooperating, activity that Spanish doctrine and law refers as “actividad 
cooperativizada” (Vasserot, 2006) and that in PECOL it is called “cooperative 
transactions” (Fajardo et al., 2017). 
Therefore, it seems that the concept of “indirect mutuality” is compatible with 
the mutualistic scope, if admitted with limits and conditions, as in the PECOL. 
Thus, “Subsidiaries held by cooperatives are only permitted if their purpose 
supports the main institutional objective of member-promotion. Economic 
activities of cooperative enterprises cannot be entirely outsourced, so that the 
cooperative society no longer has a fully operational enterprise” (Münkner, 2017: 
270-271). 
Otherwise, it carries obvious risks of demutualization of the cooperatives, 
therefore, in the matter that concerns us, it is required always a case-by-case 
analysis, in order to determine if such limits and conditions were observed. 
Actually, if the activity of the cooperatives has been transferred for the 
commercial company without any limits, we may be looking at a covert conversion 
of the cooperative into a commercial company, with the consequent violation of the 
Article 111 of the PCC, prohibiting the conversion of the cooperative into a 
commercial company. 
In fact, the Article 111 of the PCC provides that “The conversion of a 
cooperative into any form of commercial company is null and void, as are all acts 
that seek to thwart or circumvent said legal prohibition.” 
This prohibited form of conversion is heterogeneous, since the converted legal 
entity was not originally a commercial company (Correia, 2009; Lanz, 2010). 
Furthermore, the prohibited conversion includes both a formal cooperative 
conversion or a conversion by extinguishment, in which the original legal person is 
dissolved and replaced by another that succeeds it. 
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The legislator also forbids covert conversions, which are understood here as 
being any acts that allow cooperatives to access the regime of commercial 
companies. 
Two main arguments are raised by legal theory against the admissibility of 
conversions: 
(i) the dogmatic argument: the causal heterogeneity of the two legal persons; 
(ii) the public order argument: difficulties with maintaining the control by the 
public authorities that is imposed on the activities of cooperatives (this 
control could no longer be carried out if a conversion were to be accepted) 
and the possibility that the cooperative format might initially be used to 
obtain the benefits granted by the legislator to cooperatives, including tax 
benefits, followed by a conversion into a company. 
 
The first argument is based on the idea that the mutualist scope is essential to 
cooperatives and consequently that a cooperative cannot adopt a for profit purpose 
through its conversion into a commercial company without triggering its 
dissolution. This idea, which is defended in Portugal by Raúl Ventura, is based on 
a conceptual and interpretative rule according to which conversions of legal entities 
with different purposes are not permitted. The author invokes the essential 
difference in purpose between cooperatives and companies: the mutualist scope of 
cooperatives and the profit aims of commercial companies (Ventura, 1990). 
This understanding is founded on the fact that the prevailing legal theory in 
Portugal argues that cooperatives are clearly distinct from commercial companies 
since one of the essential characteristics of commercial companies is the 
distribution of profits (in the sense of capital accruals) among their shareholders 
(Abreu, 1999). 
Otherwise, it will be allowed the establishment of a commercial company by a 
cooperative or in association with other cooperatives, proving that the commercial 
company was established for the development of instrumental, preparatory or 
complementary activities of the economic activity developed between the 
cooperative and its members, keeping the main activity that was on the basis of its 
creation. The cooperative segments the activities that integrate its social object, 
delivering one or more of these activities to a subsidiary controlled or participated 
by the cooperative.  
However, unlike what some doctrine defends (Bonfante, 2010), we consider 
that it won’t be lawful a pure holding cooperative, where the cooperative simply 
holds companies’ capital without directly performing any economic activity with 
its members (Münkner, 2017: 270-271). 
We will always be able to question why, in these cases, the cooperative does not 
opt by the way that would be more natural considering the “cooperative identity” 
and that would be the establishment of a multi-sector cooperative [Article 4(2) of 
the PCC], that is to say, a cooperative that develops activities carried out by 
different branches of the cooperative sector (Leite, 2012). 
In fact, in accordance with Article 4 of the PCC, the branches existing today in 
Portugal are: consumption; trading; agriculture; credit; housing and construction; 
working production; crafts; fishing; culture; services; teaching; social solidarity, 
assuming expressly that a cooperative covers activities from several branches. 
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The multi-sector or multi-purpose cooperatives may adopt an internal 
organisation that is divided into sections created and governed in terms of their 
operations, by the cooperative’s statutes [arts. 13 and 19 of Decree-Law No. 
335/99 of 20 August 1999 (agricultural cooperatives); art. 4 of Decree-Law No. 
523/99 of 10 December 1999 (multi-sector trade cooperatives); art. 3 of Decree-
Law No. 522/99 of 10 December 1999 (multi-sector consumer cooperatives); art. 4 
of Decree-Law No. 502/99 of 19 December 1999 (multisector housing and 
building); and art. 3 of Decree-Law No. 7/98 of 15 January 1998 (social solidarity 
cooperatives)]. 
The risks of demutualization, if they exist, will be able to base a claim for civil 
liability against the members of the management and supervisory bodies (Articles 
71 and 76 of the PCC) and, ultimately, give cause to an administrative procedure of 
dissolution of the cooperatives, promoted by the “Cooperativa António Sérgio para 
a Economia Social” (CASES), as external supervisory of the cooperatives in 
Portugal, based on the non-coincidence of the cooperative activity with the express 
object in the statutes [Article 118(2) of the PCC]. 
Leaving aside the underlying reasons to the option, that do not fit in the scope 
of this study,20 the fact is that the Portuguese legislation on cooperatives does not 
recognize explicitly the concept of “indirect mutuality”, but it also does not forbid 
it. 
In this context, admitting the possibility that the cooperative can develop its 
mutualistic scope indirectly, through a company controlled by itself or where it 
withholds shareholdings together with other cooperatives, arises the problem of the 
classification of the results originated from that economic activity. Can we classify 
them as cooperative surpluses? 
The cooperative surplus is the term used in the doctrine and the legislation to 
assign the positive economic results that stem from the pursuit of the mutualistic 
scope by the cooperative, corresponding to the difference between revenue and the 
costs of the cooperativized activity with the members. It is an amount temporarily 
paid in excess by the cooperators to the cooperative or underpaid by the 
cooperative to the cooperators, in exchange for their participation in the activity of 
the cooperative (Bandeira, Meira & Alves, 2017). 
Considering this definition, it seems, at first sight, that qualifying such results as 
surpluses would imply, from the outset, the denial of the legal entity of the 
participated commercial company. The cooperative and the commercial company 
are two separate legal entities with autonomous assets. 
A possible solution would be to defend that the results originated from these 
operations developed by the companies controlled or participated by cooperatives 
should be under the regimen foreseen in the PCC for the operations with non-
members or third parties (“terceiros”). 
Indeed, the Article 2(2) of the PCC consecrates the possibility of cooperatives, 
in pursuit of their object, to conduct business with non-members, subject to any 
_____________ 
 
20  One of the arguments invoked by the cooperatives for the establishment of these economic groups concerns 
the great capitalist economic groups. See, in this regard, the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Lisbon, in 
September 29 2005, Case 2062/2005-8. The complete text can be consulted in: 
http://www.dgsi.pt/jtrl.nsf/33182fc732316039802565fa00497eec/3f6edd41f484c9c1802570c3003a06a5?Ope
nDocument&Highlight=0,associa%C3%A7%C3%A3o,de,cooperativas. 
118 Meira, D. Revesco (131) 2019: 103-124 
 
restrictions set forth in the law applicable to each cooperative branch. Even though 
the law does not define what is meant by a third party (“terceiro”) it seems to be 
settled doctrine that in the wake of the teachings of Namorado (2005: 184): “from 
the cooperative point of view, non-members are those who have a business 
relationship that is directly related to the pursuit of the cooperative’s primary object 
as if they were members, although, in fact, they are not.” 
This means that the business conducted with non-members the legislator is 
referring to is of the same kind of business as the one conducted by the cooperative 
with its members. In light of this concept of non-members or third parties 
(“terceiros”), the characterization of shareholdings in companies as a transaction 
with non-members does not seem to be adequate (Meira, 2009). 
To preserve the mutualist scope — preventing the conversion of a cooperative 
into a de facto for-profit company — Portuguese cooperative law obliges the 
allocation of financial results arising from transactions with non-members that may 
not be distributed among cooperators (Articles 100.1 and 114 of the PCC) to 
indivisible reserves (Meira, 2016).  
The basis for this legal regime is that in cooperatives, the economic results of 
transactions with non-members must be legally regarded as profit and not as a true 
cooperative surplus, since these transactions are not carried out as a part of a 
mutualistic activity. 
However, we have some reservations about the full suitability of this solution. 
The doubt persists regarding the results proceeding from operations that the 
cooperative develops indirectly of commercial companies by them withheld or 
participated jointly with other cooperatives and that refer to activities situated in 
the cooperative social object, that, despite of being instrumental or complementary 
activities, are essential for the pursuit of the mutualistic scope. Today, it seems that 
the emergence of these groups and its relevance in economic terms will impose the 
necessity to revisit the regime of determination and distribution of these results in 
the cooperative and, eventually, to argue the possibility of, with restrictions, 
distributing a part of these results by the cooperators, applying similarly the 
regimen foreseen for the patronage refund (“retorno”). 
This is the solution defended in the PECOL Principles, about the results coming 
from the subsidiaries, stating that “It should be noted (…) that the cooperative 
enterprise may include an enterprise of a subsidiary if this is necessary to satisfy 
the interest of the members and if the members of the cooperative maintain 
ultimate control over the subsidiary. In this case, this rule shall apply to the results 
of the activity carried out by the subsidiary which is necessary to satisfy the interest 
of the cooperative members” (Fajardo & Meira, 2017: 90). 
Regarding the activities situated outside the cooperative social object (extra-
cooperative activities), we will be clearly before profits (for example, results from 
the ownership of company shares or other assets). 
In any case, what is certain is that the existence of cooperative groups generates 
a diversity of economic results (Fajardo, 1997). Therefor cooperatives must have 
separate accounts that allow surpluses from activities with members to be 
distinguished from profits obtained from transactions with non-members or other 
extra-cooperative activities. These separate accounts also permit a cooperative to 
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account for its divisible and indivisible assets without the risk of confusion 
(Fajardo, 2015). 
Neither the PCC, nor the accounting legislation applicable to the cooperatives in 
Portugal (Accounting Normalization System - SNC)21 have commented on this 
question, so it is still possible, in the current state of the legislation, the non-
adoption of a separate accounts, with the consequent difficulties in terms of control 
and supervision regarding the origin, distribution and allocation of the economic 
results of the cooperatives (Meira, 2016). 
5. The issue of the quantification as entities of the social economy 
At this point, it is time to question if these commercial companies withheld or 
participated by cooperatives could be considered (and, therefore, quantified) as 
entities of the social economy sector, what constitutes the main objective of this 
study. 
The Framework Law on Social Economy (LBES) establishes, in the Article 4, 
the cast of the organizations of the social economy, stating that “they integrate the 
social economy, namely, the following entities, since established in national 
territory: a) cooperatives; b) mutual associations; c) Charities (Misericórdias); d) 
foundations; e) private institutions of social solidarity not included in the 
aforementioned ones; f) associations with altruistic purposes that act in the cultural, 
recreational, sports and local development scope; g) entities of the community and 
worker collective sub-sectors, integrated in the terms of the Constitution of the 
Portuguese Republic in the cooperative and social sector; h) other entities endowed 
with legal entity, that respect the guiding principles of the social economy, foreseen 
in the Article 5 of the LBES, and that appear in the database of the social 
economy” (Meira, 2013). 
It can be questioned if these commercial companies withheld or participated by 
cooperatives cannot be considered entities of the social economy in accordance 
with the Article 4(h) of LBES. 
In the search for an answer we cannot forget that the legislator makes this 
possibility conditional upon fulfilment of a basic requirement: the respect for the 
guiding principles of the social economy. These appear listed in the Article 5 of 
LBES, namely: “a) the primacy of the individual and of the social objects; b) free 
and voluntary membership; c) democratic control of the bodies by members; d) 
convergence of the interests of members, users or beneficiaries with the general 
interest; e) respect for the values of solidarity, equality, non-discrimination, social 
cohesion, justice, equity, transparency, shared social and individual responsibility 
and subsidiarity; f) management that is autonomous and independent from public 
authorities and any other entities not integrated in the social economy; g) the 
allocation of surpluses to the pursuit of the social objects of the social economy in 
accordance with the general interest, without prejudice to any specificity of 
_____________ 
 
21  Decree-Law No. 158/2009 of 13 July (that approved the SNC), as amended by the Decree-Law No. 86/2015 
of 11 March. 
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surpluses distribution within any social economy entity established in the 
Constitution.” 
Considering that the commercial companies pursue, primarily, a profit purpose, 
it seems, at first sight, that it does not respect the guiding principle of the primacy 
of the person and the social objectives, from the outset on the capital. It is obvious 
that one can argue that these profits cannot be distributed by the cooperators, being 
necessarily allocated to the indivisible reserves, as detached above, for what it will 
be fulfilled the guiding principle foreseen in the subparagraph g). 
It should be noted, further, the question of the respect for the principle of free 
and voluntary membership that in the case of the cooperatives will correspond to 
the cooperative principle of voluntary and open membership,22 which confers to the 
cooperative a structural variability, either in the plan of the cooperators and in the 
plan of the share capital [Article 2(1) and Article 81(1), both of the PCC]. The 
share capital of a conventional commercial company is fixed and steady, only 
being able to be modified with respect to the rigorous process foreseen in the 
statutes (Meira, 2009; Domingues, 2009). 
In addition, it will not be applied to the commercial companies withheld or 
participated by cooperatives, which, as we saw, take the form of private limited or 
public limited company, the principle of the democratic control by members. 
In the private limited or in the public limited commercial company it will be the 
share capital — and not the personal conditions of the partners — that will 
determine and organize their entire complex of rights and duties. Among the rights, 
it stands out the fundamental right to the profit, for which the rule, in the 
commercial companies, is that the partner will participate in the profits according 
to its participation in the share capital. As a matter of fact, the rule, in commercial 
companies, is that the participation in the profits will be the counterpart of the 
invested capital and, therefore, the distribution criterion depends on the 
participation of each one in the share capital (Santos, 2002). 
The participation in the share capital will be, equally, relevant regarding other 
rights of partners, namely: the right to assign a minority representative in 
administration bodies and the right of supervision of the public limited companies 
(Serens, 1997)23; the right to certain information on the life of the company 
(Labareda, 2002);24 the right to require the convening of the General Meeting, in 
_____________ 
 
22  The Principle of voluntary and open membership is formulated, in the Article 3 of the PCC, as follows: 
“Cooperatives are voluntary organisations, open to all persons able to use their services and willing to accept 
the responsibilities of membership, without gender, social, racial, political or religious discrimination.” 
23  The Article 392(6), of CSC, said that “The articles of association may also establish that a minority of 
shareholders having voted against a motion which was passed in the appointment of directors shall have the 
right to appoint at least one director, provided that this minority represents at least 10% of the share capital.”. 
In turn, the Article 418(1), of the CSC, provides that “at the request of shareholders, owners of shares 
representing one tenth, at least, of the share capital, presented in the 30 days after the general meeting that has 
chosen the members of the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Board, the court can nominate another 
effective member and a substitute for the Supervisory Board […].” Such norm will aim to assure to the 
minorities representation in the management of the company and in the nomination of the supervision body. 
24  In the public limited company, only those who hold 1% of the share capital will be able to exert the minimum 
right to information, enshrined in Article 288 of the CSC. The Article 291 consecrated the so-called collective 
right to information, stating, in paragraph 1, that “the shareholders whose shares reach 10% of the share 
capital can request, in writing, to the Board of Directors or to the Executive Board of Directors to given to 
them, also in writing, information relating to corporate matters.” 
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the private limited and public limited companies;25 and the right to suggest the 
claim for liability against the managers or the directors for damages that these have 
caused to the company (Ramos, 2002).26 
Finally, the right to vote is, generally, proportional to the value of the 
participation of the partner in the share capital (Domingues, 2015). 
It transpired from all this that the actual motivation of the partners' participation 
in a company and, consequently, its involvement in it, is mainly the profitability of 
a capital that they invested in it, therefore the percentage held in that share capital 
is reflected in the practical content of the rights of the shareholders, which will 
result in different positions of the several partners. 
Otherwise, in the cooperatives, due to the principle of the democratic member 
control (Article 3 of the PCC),27 prevails an equality of treatment of the 
cooperators, regardless of its financial participation, and consequently the rule is 
the one of the equality on the exercise of the rights, with particular emphasis on the 
right to vote (“one member, one vote”) (Meira, 2014). 
As a result, in abstract, focusing only in the legal form and in the regime that 
underlies to them, the safest solution will be to consider that the commercial 
companies withheld or participated by cooperatives cannot be considered (and, 
therefore, quantified) as entities of the social economy. 
However, the solution that seems more adequate and fair to us will be the one of 
the case-by-case analysis. Providing evidence that cooperatives established the 
subsidiary company for the satisfaction of the needs of its members, keeping the 
main activity that was at the base of its creation or, at least, a substantial part of it, 
holding the control of that subsidiary and allocating the results from the activity 
developed by the subsidiary to indivisible reserves, will be fulfilling the guiding 
principles of social economy. Thus, in these cases, these commercial companies 
withheld or participated by cooperatives should be considered entities of the social 
economy in accordance with the Article 4(h) of LBES. 
We believe that, in any case, the results in terms of employment and GVA 
generated by these entities should always be considered for statistical purposes, for 




25  The Article 248(1), of the CSC, establishes that “general meetings of private limited companies shall be 
subject to the provisions regarding the general meetings of public limited companies, in everything that is not 
specifically regulated for those”. In turn, the Article 375(2), of CSC, already mentioned, makes the possibility 
of convening the General meeting depend on the ownership of shares corresponding, at least, to 5% of the 
share capital, by one or more shareholders. 
26  The Article 77 of the CSC establishes that only those who hold 5% of the share capital will be able to bring a 
liability suit against the managers or directors to claim reparation for damages that these have caused to the 
company. 
27  The Article 3 of the PCC establishes that “Cooperatives are democratic organisations controlled by their 
members, who actively participate in setting their policies and making decisions. Men and women serving as 
elected representatives are accountable to the membership. In primary cooperatives members have equal 
voting rights (one member, one vote) and cooperatives at other levels are also organised in a democratic 
manner.” 
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6. Conclusions 
Even though we are aware that we are clearly on a shaky ground, the option, 
taken in the Social Economy Satellite Account in 2013, of not quantifying any 
commercial company owned or participated by cooperatives in the list of the social 
economy entities, it does not seem to be the most appropriate. 
Under the regime provided for in the PCC, the cooperatives may constitute 
commercial companies, subsidiaries, acquire shares in the share capital of 
commercial companies, provided that this does not affect the autonomy of the 
cooperative. 
In any of these cases, the cooperative is prohibited from group relations which 
translate into any form of “subordination” of the cooperative to the interests of 
other entities. In fact, the cooperative principles of autonomy and independence 
and democratic control by the members prevent the cooperative from being a 
controlled entity in a group of companies dominated by another legal entity. 
If the cooperative established the subsidiary to satisfy the needs of its members, 
we would be dealing with the concept of “indirect mutuality”, a concept expressly 
admitted in the legal doctrine and in the legislation of certain legal systems. The 
cooperative pursues its mutualistic scope not directly with its members, but, 
indirectly, through commercial companies controlled or participated by the 
cooperative itself. 
In these cases, if the cooperative maintains the main activity (or at least a 
substantial part thereof) that was in the basis of its creation, if it has control of this 
subsidiary and allocate the results of the activity carried out by the subsidiary to 
indivisible reserves, the guiding principles of the social economy are fulfilled. 
Thus, in terms of legal framework, these commercial companies owned or 
participated by cooperatives should be considered entities of the social economy 
sector under the Article 4(h) of LBES. 
Therefore, a case-by-case analysis will be carried out to distinguish situations of 
indirect mutuality from situations of companization of the cooperative 
phenomenon. 
If it is understandable that considering the complexity of the subject, the SESA 
of 2013 has chosen, in terms of quantification of the entities, the solution that 
would generate the least perplexity, one no longer understands the hesitation 
regarding statistical consideration of the results in terms of employment and GVA 
generated by these entities. 
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